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SPEAKE(a)R: Turn Speakers to Microphones for Fun 
and Profit 
(demo: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ez3o8aIZCDM) 
 
Abstract 
It's possible to manipulate the headphones (or earphones) connected to a computer, 
silently turning them into a pair of eavesdropping microphones – with software alone. 
The same is also true for some types of loudspeakers. This paper focuses on this threat 
in a cyber-security context. We present SPEAKE(a)R, a software that can covertly turn 
the headphones connected to a PC into a microphone. We present technical 
background and explain why most of today’s PCs and laptops are susceptible to this 
type of attack. We examine an attack scenario in which malware can use a computer 
as an eavesdropping device, even when a microphone is not present, muted, taped1, 
or turned off. We measure the signal quality and the effective distance, and survey 
the defensive countermeasures.  
1. Introduction 
Audio playing equipment such as loudspeakers, headphones, and earphones are 
widely used in PCs, laptops, smartphones, media entertainment systems, and more. 
In this section we refer to the any audio playing equipment that contains speakers 
(loudspeakers, headphones, earphones, etc.) as speakers. 
Speakers aim at amplifying audio streams out, but in fact, a speaker can be seen as a 
microphone working in reverse mode: loudspeakers convert electric signals into a 
sound waveform, while microphones transform sounds into electric signals. Speakers 
use the changing magnetic field induced by electric signals to move a diaphragm in 
order to produce sounds. Similarly, in microphone devices, a small diaphragm moves 
through a magnetic field according to a sound’s air pressure, inducing a corresponding 
electric signal [1]. This bidirectional mechanism facilitates the use of simple 
headphones as a feasible microphone, simply by plugging them into the PC 
microphone jack.  
 
                                                           
1 "Why has Mark Zuckerberg taped over the webcam and microphone on his MacBook"? [32] 
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1.2 Speaker retasking 
A typical computer chassis contains a number of audio jacks, either in the front panel, 
rear panel, or both. These jacks are the sockets for plugging in various audio 
equipment such as speakers, headphones, and microphones. Each jack is used either 
for input (line in), or for output (line out). The audio ports usually have a conventional 
coloring system; typically green is used for speakers (output jack), blue for line in 
(input jack), and pink for microphones (input jack). 
Interestingly, the audio chipsets in modern motherboards and sound cards include an 
option to change the function of an audio port at a software level, a type of audio port 
programming sometimes referred to as jack retasking or jack remapping. This option 
is available on Realtek's (Realtek Semiconductor Corp.) audio chipsets, which are 
integrated into a wide range of PC motherboards today. Jack retasking – although 
documented in applicable technical specifications – is not well known, as was 
mentioned by the Linux audio developer, David Henningsson, in his blog: 
"Most of today’s built-in sound cards are to some degree retaskable, which means that 
they can be used for more than one thing. …the kernel exposes an interface that makes 
it possible to retask your jacks, but almost no one seems to use it, or even know about 
it" [2].   
1.3 The threat 
The fact that headphones and earphones are physically built like microphones, 
coupled with the fact that an audio port’s role in the PC can be altered 
programmatically from output to input, creates a vulnerability which can be abused 
by hackers. A malware can stealthy reconfigure the headphone jack from a line out 
jack to a microphone jack. As a result, the connected headphones can function as a 
pair of recording microphones, thereby rendering the computer into an 
eavesdropping device – even when the computer doesn't have a connected 
microphone (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of SPEAKE(a)R. Headphones, speakers, and earphones are connected to a computer which 
have no microphone. A malware within the computer turn them into microphones. Note that in scenario C the 
method required 'passive' loudspeakers, which are rarely in use today.   
 In this paper we provide a technical overview of SPEAKE(a)R – a malware that can 
covertly transform headphones into a pair of microphones – and show how it can be 
exploited in different scenarios. We also evaluate its efficacy and the signal quality, 
and present defensive countermeasures. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Technical background is provided in 
section 2. Section 3 discusses threat scenarios. Section 4 describes the experimental 
results. Section 5 presents related work. Countermeasures are discussed in section 6. 
We conclude in Section 7. 
2. Technical Background  
The fact that speakers can be used in reverse mode, and hence, can function as 
microphones has been known for years, and is well documented in professional  
literature [1] [3]. However, this by itself doesn’t raise a security concern, since it 
requires a speaker to be intentionally plugged into the microphone jack (an input port) 
in order to play the role of a microphone. 
A glance into security related issues of such a 'speaker-as-microphone' scenario can 
be found in a partially declassified document released by the NSA in 2000, in response 
to an appeal of an earlier Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. The document 
is a guide to the installation of system equipment that takes into account red/black 
security concerns. It contains the following paragraph:    
"In addition to being a possible fortuitous conductor of TEMPEST emanations, the 
speakers in paging, intercom and public address systems can act as microphones and 
retransmit classified audio discussions out of the controlled area via the signal line 
distribution. This microphonic problem could also allow audio from higher classified 
areas to be heard from speakers in lesser classified areas. Ideally. Such systems should 
not be used. Where deemed vital, the following precautions should be taken in full or 
in part to lessen the risk of the system becoming an escape medium for NSI." 
(NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95, RED/BLACK INSTALLATION [4] [5]). 
2.1 Speakers, Headphones, and Earphones 
Dynamic microphones are the inverse of dynamic loudspeakers. In the former, sound 
pressure variations move a membrane attached to a coil of wire in a magnetic field, 
generating an electric current/voltage. The inverse happens with loudspeakers: the 
electric voltage associated with a sound drives an electric current through a coil in the 
magnetic field, generating a force on the coil and moving the membrane attached to 
it, producing sound in the air (Figure 2). In fact, in simple intercom systems the same 
mechanism is used as either a microphone or loudspeaker. 
 Figure 2. Basic illustration of audio recording and playing, demonstrating that the speaker and microphone are 
inverses of each other. 
Active Loudspeakers vs. Passive Loudspeakers 
Note, however, that the reversibility principle poses a limitation: the speaker must be 
passive (unpowered), without amplifier transitions. In the case of an active (self-
powered) speaker, there is an amplifier between the jack and the speaker, hence the 
signal won't be passed from the output to the input side [6]. Since most modern 
loudspeakers have an internal amplifier [7], the threat presented in this paper is 
primarily relevant to headphones and earphones, and not to the loudspeakers 
typically connected to a PC.  
2.2 Jack Retasking/Remapping 
Desktop PCs may have a built-in (onboard) audio chip or external sound card. Typical 
PCs include various analog input and output jacks (audio ports). Input jacks are used 
for microphones or other sources of audio stream. The input data is sampled and 
processed by the audio hardware. Output jacks are used for loudspeakers, 
headphones, and other analog output playback devices. As noted, the capability of 
changing the functionality of the audio jacks is referred to as jack retasking or jack 
remapping.  
Intel High Definition (HD) Audio (the successor of AC'97) is the standard audio 
component on modern PCs. Jack retasking is now part of the Intel High Definition 
Audio specification [8]. In this standard, the audio chip on the motherboard is referred 
to as an audio codec. The audio codec communicates with the host via a PCI or other 
system bus. Realtek Semiconductor Corp. provides the audio codec chip for many 
motherboards and chipset manufacturers, and is thus integrated in a wide range of 
desktop workstations and notebooks. The most common Realtek codecs for PCs are 
the multi-channel high definition audio codec series presented in Table 1. As noted in 
the table, the listed codec chips support jack retasking. 
Table 1. Realtek codec chips that support jack retasking 
Realtek codec chips (all support jack retasking) Integrated in 
ALC892, ALC889, ALC885, ALC888, ALC663, 
ALC662, ALC268, ALC262, ALC267, ALC272, 
ALC269, ALC3220 
Desktop PCs, 
Notebooks 
 
In this paper we primarily focus on Realtek codec chips, since they are the most 
common codecs in PCs. It's important to note that other codec manufacturers support 
jack retasking as well [9] [10]. 
2.2.1 Hardware Interface 
At the hardware level, jack retasking means that the retaskable audio jacks are 
connected with both analog to ADC (analog-to-digital convertor) and DAC (digital-to-
analog convertor) components, and hence can operate as input (microphone) or 
output (speaker) signal ports. 
 
Figure 3. Jack retasking at the hardware level. 
Figure 3 shows input/output retasking at the hardware level, based on the Realtek 
design [11]. The schematic diagram of the mic/line physical sockets illustrates two 
electrical circuits connected to the same physical socket. Choosing the input 
configuration enables the leg of the IBUF to rise, powering on the buffer, and allowing 
the signal to enter the computer. In contrast, choosing the output configuration 
enables the legs of the OBUF and the AMP to rise and enables the output buffer and 
amplifier. This action allows the signal to flow out from computer to the socket. When 
buffers are not enabled, no signal can go through.  
2.2.1 HD Audio Codec Interface  
The HD audio component consists of the controller and codec chips on the HD audio 
bus. Each codec contains various type of widgets, which are logical components that 
operate within the codec. Software can send messages (or verbs) to widgets in order 
to read or modify their settings. Such verbs are sent via the HDA link, which is a serial 
interface that connect the audio codec to the host PC. Typical messages to the audio 
codec are structured as [NID][Verb][Payload], where NID is the node 
identifier (e.g., the widget to operate on), Verb is the type of operation (e.g., set 
configuration), and Payload contains the parameters for the operation (e.g., the 
configuration parameters). 
The HD audio codec defines a number of pin widgets. Each pin, including the audio 
jack ports, has its own configuration. The configuration includes the jack color, 
location (rear, front, top, etc.), connection type (in or out), and other properties. For 
example, in the Realtek ALC892 chip, pins 14-17 (LINE2-L, LINE2-R, MIC2-L, MIC2-R), 
pins 21-24 (MIC1-L, MIC1-R, LINE1-L, LINE1-R), and pins 35-36 (FRONT-L, FRONT-R) are 
the analog input and output pins. In the retaskable pins (e.g., 14-17), it is possible to 
change the default configuration and its functionality, from out (e.g., headphone or 
speaker) to in (microphone), and vice versa. The HDA specification defines the 
complete codec architecture that allows a software driver to control various types of 
operations [8].  
2.2.2 Operating System Interface 
The vendors of audio codec chips, such as Realtek and Conexant, provide kernel 
drivers which implement the codec's functionality, including retasking, and expose it 
to the user mode programs. For example, the Realtek driver for Microsoft Windows 
allows remapping the audio jack via specific values in the Windows Registry. A guide 
for how to remap Realtek onboard jacks in Microsoft Windows can be found in [12]. 
The Linux kernel, a part of the Advanced Linux Sound Architecture (ALSA), exposes an 
interface that enables the jack configuration; the hda-jack-retask tool is a user 
mode program for Linux that allows the manipulation of the HD audio pins' control via 
a GUI interface [13]. 
3. Threat Scenarios 
There are two main threat scenarios for using headphones as a microphone. The first 
scenario involves a PC that is not equipped with a microphone (or in which the 
microphone is muted or turned off) but has connected headphones, earphones, or 
passive speakers. In this scenario, a malware installed on the computer may 
reconfigure the headphone jack into a microphone jack. Usually (during normal 
system behavior), such reconfiguration takes place only while the headphones are not 
in use, such as when audio output is triggered (e.g., the user is playing music), and the 
microphone jack is instantly reconfigured back into a headphone jack. In the second 
scenario, the computer may be equipped with both microphone and headphones, but 
the headphones are better positioned for the desired recording, e.g., headphone are 
closer to the voice source and hence, can achieve better recording quality. 
4. Experimental Results 
The following experiments were conducted in order to assess the efficacy of using a 
headphone as a microphone as follows. Initially, we use headphones (instead of a 
microphone) to record environment sounds and investigate the effect of this on audio 
quality. Then we investigate the headphones’ effectiveness as a receiver in digital 
communication protocols. 
A series of audio quality measurements were collected in order to evaluate audio 
degradation when the audio is recorded via headphones instead of standard 
microphones. To measure speech intelligibility in different experimental setups, we 
used a set of pre-recorded sentences as a reference. More specifically, we selected a 
list of phonetically balanced sentences in English as our clean audio reference [14]. 
The list is comprised of simple phrases containing phonemes (in the same proportion 
as spoken English), which are often used for standardized development and testing of 
telecommunication systems, from cellphones to Voice over IP. This methodology 
enables quick and automatic evaluations of speech coding protocols. 
The actual reference audio used during the experiments was taken from the open 
speech repository [15]. We used an 8 kHz recording of one of the lists by a male 
speaker. The audio was played at a high volume through commercial multimedia 
computer speakers (Genius SP-S110) and recorded using an off the shelf microphone 
device (Silverline MM202) and headphones (Sennheiser HD 25-1 II). Several objective 
speech quality measures were evaluated to estimate the degradation associated with 
the use of the headphones as described below.  The experimental setups varied based on 
the distance between the computer playing the sound and the recording computer. In 
addition, we encoded and decoded the pre-recorded audio in order to simulate a 
situation in which the locally recorded audio is further transmitted from the recording 
computer to a remote computer.  
Objective Measures of Speech Quality 
The objective speech quality measures used in this research were estimated through 
the SNReval toolbox [16]. For each experimental setup we used the five objective 
speech quality measures provided by the toolbox and listed below. Implementation 
details for these measures, as well as additional information, can be found in [16]. 
1. NIST STNR   
2. WADA SNR   
3. SNR_VAD 
4. BSS_EVAL (SAR)  
5. PESQ   
The first three measures focus on some version of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), the ratio 
between the energy of some speech signal to that of its contaminating noise. In 
contrast, the last two measures reflect the distortion level of the recorded speech 
signal with respect to the reference pre-recorded (played aloud) signal and are more 
directly related to the intelligibility level of the recorded speech. 
4.1 Results 
 
Table 2. Reference 
NIST STNR (dB) WADA SNR (dB) SNR VAD (dB) 
40.5 49.2 10.1 
 
Table 3. Headphones 
Distance (m) NIST STNR (dB) WADA SNR (dB) SNR VAD (dB) SAR (dB) PESQ MOS 
1 7.5 3.0 2.8 3.7 2.6 
3 7.0 -20.0 -7.2 -2.8 2.0 
5 6.5 -20.0 -6.1 -5.9 2.0 
7 7.8 -2.4 -11.0 -5.5 2.2 
9 8.0 -10.4 -20.6 -4.3 2.0 
 
Table 4. Microphone 
Distance (m) NIST STNR (dB) WADA SNR (dB) SNR VAD (dB) SAR (dB) PESQ MOS 
1 29.0 22.6 6.7 8.7 2.5 
9 13.8 8.0 4.8 -3.8 2.0 
 
Table 5. ACC coding/decoding 
Distance (m) NIST STNR (dB) WADA SNR (dB) SNR VAD (dB) SAR (dB) PESQ MOS 
0 (Ref.) 39.5 54.4 2.1 12.0 3.5 
1 7.5 4.9 -2.0 2.7 2.5 
5 6.5 -1.2 -9.4 -5.6 1.9 
9 7.8 -1.2 -19.2 -4.5 1.9 
 
Table 2 provides the SNR measurements in decibels (dB) of the reference signal used 
in the experiments, namely, a sequential reading of sentences in the list (previously 
described), resulting in a file 40 seconds long. Note that SAR and PESQ measures are 
not estimated since  this table addresses the pre-recorded reference signal alone. 
Tables 3 and 4 (respectively) list the results for the quality measures for the 
headphone as microphone and microphone scenarios for different recording 
distances.   
In Table 5 we show the quality degradation of the reference signal and headphone 
recorded speech after encoding and decoding, reproducing a subsequent 
transmission of the acquired speech via the Internet. The codec used was the 
Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) [17], the potential MP3 successor and the default codec 
for YouTube, the iPhone, iPod, and other media devices. This codec has a compression 
ratio of approximately 10 to one. 
We note that, in general, SNR measurements are highly dependent on an accurate 
segmentation of speech versus noise excerpts. Therefore, in order to optimize 
segmentation accuracy and consistency across the different setups investigated, voice 
activity detection (VAD) was estimated for the reference and not recorded signals. 
This segmentation was then applied to reference and recorded pairs of signals after 
they have been time-aligned through cross-correlation.  
Frequency Domain 
In addition to the several objective SNR measures presented, we also provide 
frequency domain graphs corresponding to features used in the above calculations, 
comparing four transmission setups: (1) microphone, one meter apart (2) 
headphones, one meter apart, (3) headphones, five meters apart, and (4) 
headphones, nine meters apart. 
 
 
Figure 4. Average signal and noise energy bands for microphone, one meter apart (top left); headphones, one 
meter apart (top right); headphones, five meters apart (bottom left); and headphones, nine meters apart 
(bottom right). 
Figure 4 displays average energy in voice-active regions (signal) compared to the 
average energy in voice-inactive (noise) regions. Note the sharp drop in the SNR in for 
the headphone channel setup for frequencies above around 1500 Hz in comparison 
with the microphone setup. High frequencies are further compromised as recording 
distance increases. 
 Figure 5. Energy histograms for microphone, one meter apart (top left); headphones, one meter apart (top right); 
headphones, five meters apart (bottom left); and headphones, nine meters apart (bottom right). 
 
Figure 5 contains histograms for the dB energy levels for each frequency band. The 
histograms illustrate the lack of spectrum variability for the headphone spectra in 
comparison with that of the microphone. Note, as well, the relatively flat energy 
distribution for the headphones, especially at higher frequencies.   
Figure 6 displays spectrogram views in which the darker regions correspond to signal 
energy in contrast to the brighter regions which correspond to noise. The 
spectrograms further emphasize the information loss found for the headphone 
recordings with respect to the microphone, particularly at higher frequencies. 
 
 Figure 6. Spectrogram views for microphone, one meter apart (top left); headphones, one meter apart (top 
right); headphones, five meters apart (bottom left); and headphones, nine meters apart (bottom right). 
 
The results portrayed in the figures and tables indicate that, among the speech quality 
measures utilized, the BSS_EVAL (SAR) and SNR VAD are those most correlated with 
reality. These measures consistently decrease with increasing distance, are far better 
for microphone recordings (versus headphone recordings), and decrease after AAC 
coding, as expected. The SAR index is of particular interest, since it is known to 
correlate, to a certain extent, with subjective ratings thus assessing speech 
intelligibility. Note, for instance, that the SAR index for a microphone positioned nine 
meters away from the speech source lies in between the indexes for headphones located 
three and five meters apart from the speech source. In addition, note that the codec’s 
impact on degradation does not contribute to a substantial decrease in the speech quality.   In 
general, our experiments suggest that reasonable an intelligible audio transmission 
can be achieved from a few meters using headphones as a microphone. 
Channel Capacity 
So far, we assessed the quality attained using headphones as microphones for speech 
transmission. In this chapter, we investigate the potential of using the headphone 
acquired acoustic waves to convey digital information, in terms of channel capacity. 
We focus on frequencies beyond the hearing range, which can be seen as secure and 
covert channels for transferring information between two computers.   
Channel capacity (C) is a measure of the theoretical upper bound on the rate at which 
information can be transmitted (in bits per second) over a communication channel by 
means of signal S. Under the assumptions of additive interfering Gaussian noise (N) 
and available bandwidth (B (Hz)), the channel capacity can be calculated using the 
Shannon–Hartley theorem [17]; 
ܥ ൌ ܤ logଶ ൬1 ൅
ܵ
ܰ
൰ 
The formula informs us that the higher the SNR and channel bandwidth, the higher 
the amount of information that can be conveyed. Note that for large SNRs (S/N >>1), 
ܥ ൎ 0.33. ܤ. ܴܵܰ ሺ݀ܤሻ. Using this approximation, Figure 7 shows SNR values and 
respective channel capacity measured for different frequency ranges in our 
experimental setup, calculated as follows. Similarly to the previous experiments, pure 
sinusoidal tones were played from a source at different distances from the receiving 
computer and recorded via the headphones at a 44.1 kHz sample rate. The SNR was 
estimated for consecutive 100 Hz frequency bands up to 22 kHz, as the power ratio 
between the respective frequency tone and the average background noise over the 
bandwidth. SNR values were then used to estimate the channel capacity for each of 
the 100 Hz bandwidth sub-channels for different transmission distances, using the 
linear approximation described. 
Our experiments suggest that headphones turned into microphone have significant 
potential for covert information transmission. In particular, considering that normal 
human hearing capabilities typically drop at frequencies over 10 kHz, and large 
inaudible spectrum regions are available for communication at reasonable rates.   
 
 
Figure 7. Channel capacity and SNR as a function of frequency. 
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The SNR can be reduced by averaging the outputs of two sampled channels. Assuming 
that the noise signals present at different channels are random and thus uncorrelated, 
summing the headphone/loudspeaker left and right channels would average out the 
noise, while enhancing the desired signals which are correlated. Theoretically, the 
uncorrelated noise sums as a root sum square, resulting in a 1.4 (square of two) 
increase, while perfectly correlated signals increase by a factor of 2. This difference 
yields a 3 dB increase in the SNR. Nevertheless, in practice, we did not succeed in 
improving the SNR of speech signals acquired through the headphones. We aligned 
and summed left and right headphone channels capturing speech from a distance of 
one meter, but the overall SNR gain obtained was a marginal 0.1 dB. We believe that 
due to the headphone channels proximity, there is a high level of correlation between 
the channels and the averaging process is not efficient.  
5. Related Work 
It is known that PC malware and mobile apps can use a microphone for spying 
purposes, and many types of spyware have been found in the wild [18] [19] [20] [21] 
[22] [23]. In 2015, Google has removed its listening software from the Chromium 
browser after complaints from privacy campaigners for potentially exposing private 
conversations [24]. More recently, Facebook was suspected of (and denied) using a 
mobile device's microphone to eavesdrop on conversations so it could better target 
ads [25]. In addition, there are currently many applications sold on the Internet that 
facilitate the use of microphones and cameras to gather information for surveillance 
and other purposes [26]. However, such mobile or desktop applications require either 
built-in or external microphones. 
The general principle that an audio speaker is the exact inverse of an active 
microphone has been well known for years [3], as are the security concerns it raises 
[5] [27]. Lee et al. suggested turning the computer speaker into a microphone to 
establish covert communication between two loudspeakers at a limited distance of 10 
centimeters [27].  Their work provides comprehensive measurements of different 
covert acoustic scenarios. However, most of the loudspeakers connected to PCs today 
have an integral amplifier which prevents passing any signal from output to input, and 
consequentially, beside [27]the threat of turning speakers into microphones in 
modern PCs for eavesdropping hasn’t attracted much interest by security researchers 
so far. 
6. Countermeasures 
 
Countermeasures can be categorized into hardware and software countermeasures. 
   
Hardware Countermeasures 
In highly secure facilities it is common practice to forbid the use of any speakers, 
headphones, or earphones in order to create so-called audio gap separation [28]. Less 
restrictive policies prohibit the use of microphones but allow loudspeakers, however 
because speakers can be reversed and used as microphones, only active one way 
speakers are allowed. Such a policy was suggested by the NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95, 
RED/BLACK installation guide [29]. In this guide the protective measures state that 
"Amplifiers should be considered for speakers in higher classified areas to provide 
reverse isolation to prevent audio from being heard in lesser classified areas." Some 
TEMPEST certified loudspeakers are shipped with amplifiers and one way fiber input 
[30]. Such a protective measure is not relevant to most modern headphones, which 
are primarily built without amplifiers. Other hardware countermeasures include white 
noise emitters and audio jammers which offer another type of solution aimed at 
ruining audio recordings by transmitting ambient sounds that interfere with 
eavesdroppers and don’t allow them to accurately capture what is being said [31].  
 
Software Countermeasures 
Software countermeasures may include disabling the audio hardware in the UEFI/BIOS 
settings. This can prevent a malware from accessing the audio codec from the 
operating system. However, such a configuration eliminates the use of the audio 
hardware (e.g., for music playing, Skype chats, etc.), and hence may not be feasible in 
all scenarios. Another option is to use the HD audio kernel driver to prevent rejacking 
or to enforce a strict rejacking policy. For closed-source OSs (such as Microsoft 
Windows) such a driver must be developed and supported by audio codec vendors. In 
an improved approach, the kernel driver would prevent only out-to-in (speaker to mic) 
jack retasking, while enabling the use of other types of jack retasking. The kernel driver 
could also trigger an alert message when a microphone is being accessed, requesting 
explicit approval of such an operation from the user. In the same manner, anti-
malware and intrusion detection systems can employ API monitoring to detect such 
unauthorized speaker-to-mic retasking operations and block them. A list of 
countermeasures, along with their pros and cons, is provided in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Countermeasures 
Countermeasure Pros/Cons 
Eliminate headphones/earphones/speakers Pro: Hermetic protection 
Con: Low usability 
Using one way speakers Pro: Hermetic protection 
Con: Not relevant to headphones and earphones 
BIOS/UEFI audio codec disable Pro: Easy to deploy 
Con: Low usability 
Kernel driver policy enforcement Pro: Easy to deploy 
Con: Can be manipulated by software 
Rejacking detection and alert Pro: Easy to deploy 
Con: Can be manipulated by software 
White noise emitters/audio jammers Con: Hard to deploy due to the environmental noise 
it generates 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Audio playing devices such as headphones and earphones (and certain types of 
loudspeakers) can be seen as microphones working in reverse mode: speakers convert 
electric signals into a sound waveform, while microphones transform sounds into 
electric signals. This physical fact alone may not pose a security threat, however 
modern PC and laptops motherboards include integrated audio codecs hardware 
which allow for modification of the audio jacks' functionality from output to input 
within software. In this paper we examine this issue in the context of cyber-security. 
We present SPEAKE(a)R a software that can render a PC, even once without 
microphones, into a eavesdropping device. We examine the technical properties of 
audio codec chips and explain why modern computers are vulnerable to this type of 
attack. We also present attack scenarios and evaluate the signal quality received by 
simple off the shelf headphones (with no microphone), when used as a microphones. 
Our experiments demonstrate that intelligible audio can be acquired through 
earphones and can then be transmitted distances up to several meters away. In 
addition, we showed that the same setup achieves channel capacity rates close to 1 
Kbps in a wide range of frequencies. 
 
 
8. Bibliography 
 
[1]  G. Ballou, Handbook for Sound Engineers, 4th Ed, Taylor and Francis, 2013.  
[2]  D. Henningsson, "Turn your mic jack into a headphone jack!," [Online]. Available: 
http://voices.canonical.com/david.henningsson/2011/11/29/turn-your-mic-jack-into-
a-headphone-jack/. 
[3]  "All Speakers are Microphones," [Online]. Available: http://www.zyra.org.uk/sp-
mic.htm. 
[4]  National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Advisory 
Memorandum (NSTISSAM), "NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95, RED/BLACK INSTALLATION," 
[Online]. Available: http://cryptome.info/0001/tempest-2-95.htm. 
[5]  National Security Systems Advisory Memorandum (CNSSAM) , "CNSSAM TEMPEST/1-
13 (U) RED/BLACK Installation Guidane," 2014. [Online]. Available: 
https://cryptome.org/2014/10/cnssam-tempest-1-13.pdf. [Accessed 10 2016]. 
[6]  B. Duncan, High Performance Audio Power Amplifiers, Newnes, 1996.  
[7]  "wikipedia," [Online]. Available: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Powered_speakers#Passive_speakers. 
[8]  Intel, "High Definition Audio Specification," 2010. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/standards/high-definition-audio-
specification.html. [Accessed 2016]. 
[9]  conexant, "CX20952 Low-Power High Definition Audio CODEC," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.conexant.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/pb_CX20952.pdf. 
[10]  IDT, "2-CHANNEL HIGH DEFINITION AUDIO CODEC WITH STAC9202," [Online]. 
Available: http://www.hardwaresecrets.com/datasheets/STAC9202.pdf. 
[11]  Realtek, "ALC892," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.realtek.com.tw/products/productsView.aspx?Langid=1&PFid=28&Level=
5&Conn=4&ProdID=284. 
[12]  "How to remap / retasking Realtek onboard jacks / ports," [Online]. Available: 
https://www.reaper-x.com/2012/02/13/how-to-remap-retasking-realtek-onboard-
jacks-ports/. 
[13]  D. Henningsson, "Turn your mic jack into a headphone jack!," 2011. [Online]. 
Available: http://voices.canonical.com/david.henningsson/2011/11/29/turn-your-
mic-jack-into-a-headphone-jack/. [Accessed 2016]. 
[14]  "IEEE Subcommittee on Subjective Measurements IEEE Recommended Practices for 
Speech Quality Measurements," IEEE Transactions on Audio and Electroacoustics , 
vol. 17, no. 227-46, 1969.  
[15]  [Online]. Available: 
http://www.voiptroubleshooter.com/open_speech/american.html. 
[16]  [Online]. Available: http://labrosa.ee.columbia.edu/projects/snreval/. 
[17]  C. Shannon, "Communication in the presence of Noise," Proc. IRE, vol. 37, pp. 10-2, 
1949.  
[18]  elaman, "FinFisher IT Intrusion Products," [Online]. Available: 
https://wikileaks.org/spyfiles/files/0/310_ELAMAN-
IT_INTRUSION_FINFISHER_INTRODUCTION_V02-08.pdf. [Accessed 06 11 2016]. 
[19]  BGR, "Former NSA hacker demos how Mac malware can spy on your webcam," 06 10 
2016. [Online]. Available: http://bgr.com/2016/10/06/mac-malware-nsa-webcam-
patrick-wardle/. [Accessed 06 11 2016]. 
[20]  R. Farley and X. Wang, "Roving bugnet: Distributed surveillance threat and 
mitigation," Computers & Security, vol. 29, no. 5, p. 592–602, 2010.  
[21]  cnet, "Android malware uses your PC's own mic to record you," 02 2013. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.cnet.com/news/android-malware-uses-your-pcs-own-mic-to-
record-you/. [Accessed 09 2016]. 
[22]  "MOBILE PRIVACY BEST PRACTICES," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.im.gov.ab.ca/documents/training/OIPC_Mobile_Privacy_and_Security_2
014-12-11.pdf. 
[23]  techdirt, "Smartphone Apps Quietly Using Phone Microphones And Cameras To 
Gather Data," [Online]. Available: 
https://www.techdirt.com/blog/wireless/articles/20110417/21485513927/smartpho
ne-apps-quietly-using-phone-microphones-cameras-to-gather-data.shtml. 
[24]  The Guardian, "Google eavesdropping tool installed on computers without 
permission," The Guardian, 23 06 2015. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/23/google-eavesdropping-tool-
installed-computers-without-permission. [Accessed 03 11 2016]. 
[25]  A. Griffin, http://www.independent.co.uk/, 05 2016. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-using-
people-s-phones-to-listen-in-on-what-they-re-saying-claims-professor-
a7057526.html. [Accessed 11 2016]. 
[26]  L. Simon and R. Anderson, "PIN skimmer: inferring PINs through the camera and 
microphone," in SPSM '13 Proceedings of the Third ACM workshop on Security and 
privacy in smartphones & mobile devices, 2013.  
[27]  E. Lee, H. Kim and J. W. Yoon, "Various Threat Models to Circumvent Air-Gapped 
Systems for Preventing Network Attack," in Information Security Applications, 2015.  
[28]  a. Blog, "Air Gap Computer Network Security," [Online]. Available: 
http://abclegaldocs.com/blog-Colorado-Notary/air-gap-computer-network-security/. 
[29]  R. I. GUIDANCE, "NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95," 12 12 1995. [Online]. Available: 
https://cryptome.org/tempest-2-95.htm. [Accessed 01 07 2016]. 
[30]  [Online]. Available: http://www.cissecure.com/products/tempest-amplified-speaker-
fiber. 
[31]  L. Bellinger, "9 Counter Surveillance Tools You Can Legally Use," 
independentlivingnews, 11 2013. [Online]. Available: 
https://independentlivingnews.com/2013/11/12/20397-9-counter-surveillance-tools-
you-can-legally-use/. [Accessed 09 2016]. 
[32]  J. Titcomb, "The Telegraph," 23 06 2016. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/06/22/why-has-mark-zuckerberg-
taped-over-the-webcam-and-microphone-on/. [Accessed 06 11 2016]. 
 
 
